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Abstract
This paper relates to the current discussion about how to measure the net cost and the unfair
burden of universal service provision in network industries. The established profitability cost
approach compares the profit of a universal service provider (USP) with and without a universal
service obligation (USO). This paper argues that the net cost of universal service provision
critically depends on the regulatory counterfactual and hence the USP’s strategy space without
USO. On the one hand, a strong USO limits the USP’s means to position itself in the market,
which offers cream-skimming opportunities and invites competition. On the other hand, a simple
game-theoretic entry analysis shows that the USO may effectively serve as a valuable strategic
commitment device to deter entry. Hence, the USO may be valuable to the USP despite causing
inefficient operations. From a policy perspective, this constitutes a counter-intuitive result for the
definition of the USO: the stricter it is regulated, the more detrimental it may be to competition
and, therefore, the smaller is its burden on the USP.
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1 Introduction 
Many network industries used to be dominated by state-owned monopolies 
coupled with rate of return regulations. During the past twenty years, govern-
ments in many parts of the world have started liberalizing network industries, e.g. 
telecommunications, postal services, electricity, and transport. This liberalization 
process started in the United States in the late 1970s and in the United Kingdom 
in the early 1980s. Since then, sectors such as telecommunications and air trans-
port have become fully liberalized in the European Union and are becoming in-
creasingly competitive. The electricity sector, postal services, and railways are not 
yet fully liberalized. A common issue in network industries is the existence of a 
universal service obligation (USO) which traditionally has been financed by re-
served areas (legal monopolies). After liberalization, it becomes an important 
question, what the net cost and the financial burden of the USO exactly is. 
There are several reasons why governments and regulators may want to 
introduce or maintain universal services: Equity, economic development and effi-
ciency in the case of market failure, such as network externalities.
1
The standard 
argument for uniform pricing – which is often an important aspect of the USO – is 
that it reduces the transaction costs for customers.
2
This argument now applies 
mostly to small customers, where the transaction costs resulting from non-
uniform pricing would be significant. There have been recent proposals to relax 
the uniform pricing constraint of the traditional USO, e.g. Crew and Kleindorfer 
(2007) in the postal sector. These proposals are directed not only toward single-
piece letters, but also toward bulk mail originating from large mailers which are 
subject to uniform tariffs resulting from worksharing discounts based on avoided 
cost. 
All binding universal service obligations cause a direct net cost to their 
provider as they interfere with its business strategy. To be compensated for the 
associated burden, many universal service providers (USPs) have traditionally 
benefited from a reserved area. Crew and Kleindorfer (1998) develop the opti-
mum size of monopoly in the postal sector to allow the USP to break even when 
providing universal services. Due to recent steps toward liberalized markets the 
need for alternative funding sources has emerged. Therefore, it has become im-
portant for regulators and the public to know the cost of universal service provi-
sion. 
In recent years, many contributions have been published on the issue of 
how to calculate the „net cost‟ or „burden‟ of the universal service obligation. 
Panzar (2000) and Cremer et al. (2000) provide a theoretical foundation for the 
                                                
1
See Cremer et al. (1998, 2008). 
2
See e.g. Crew and Kleindorfer (1998). 
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so-called profitability cost approach. This approach compares a firm‟s profit level 
in a liberalized market with and without the USO. In order to derive the net cost, a 
benchmark scenario must be specified in which a firm faces no binding constraint 
regarding the services it offers. The net incremental cost of universal service pro-
vision is equivalent to the difference in total cost less the additional revenue. The 
difference in total cost results from the total cost after the universal service obli-
gation‟s introduction less the total cost in the benchmark scenario. The additional 
revenue with the USO is equal to the revenue from those market segments which 
are served only after the introduction of the universal service obligation. Without 
the USO, a firm can offer individual services at prices which are higher than spe-
cified by the universal service obligation. The introduction of a universal service 
obligation causes the firm to incur losses whenever the lower prices are not com-
pensated by the increased demand. These losses are foregone revenue. The sum of 
the net incremental cost and foregone revenue equals the profitability cost. This 
approach has already been practically implemented in the postal sector in a num-
ber of countries, e.g. in Denmark (Copenhagen Economics, 2008), Norway (Ber-
gum, 2008), in the UK (Frontier Economics, 2008), and in the US (Cohen et al., 
2010). 
In 2008, the European Parliament issued the Third Postal Directive 
(2008/6/EC). Annex I gives the Member States guidance as for how to calculate 
the net cost of universal service obligations:
 3
“The net cost of universal service obligations is to be calculated, as 
the difference between the net cost for a designated universal service 
provider of operating with the universal service obligations and the 
same postal service provider operating without the universal service 
obligations.” 
If policy makers compensate the USP by this difference, it achieves the same 
profit as it would in the postal market without any obligations. This does not au-
tomatically imply that there is an unfair burden associated with universal service 
provision.
4
The profitability cost approach together with the concept of an „unfair 
burden‟ is supposed to determine the compensation that makes the designated 
USP indifferent whether to provide the USO or not. It has often been pointed out 
that in practice it is hard to define what the difference between the USO and non-
                                                
3
Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Annex I. The Third Postal 
Directive follows the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC) concerning the telecommunica-
tions market in this respect. 
4
For a discussion of various possible definitions of an unfair burden, see Boldron et al. (2009) or 
Jaag (2010). 
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USO profit levels is, as one of the scenarios is counterfactual and not observable, 
even ex post. 
In this paper we show that the net cost of the USO and the burden of uni-
versal service provision depends not only on the counterfactual competitive sce-
nario but also on the regulatory benchmark regime: If there is no USO at all in the 
alternative scenario, the USP‟s strategy is different from the one in a situation in 
which another firm is bound by universal service constraints. 
Our model approach is similar to Valletti et al. (2002) who analyze the 
strategic effects of regulatory interventions such as uniform pricing and coverage 
constraints. In their model with two operating firms, there are several regions with 
either both, one or zero firms operating in equilibrium. They assume that there is 
an incumbent which is the designated USP and therefore automatically the bigger 
one of the two firms. They find that a welfare evaluation of USO policies should 
take into account the interaction of various aspects of the USO and between dif-
ferent market segments or areas. Also, Boldron et al. (2008) argue that the market 
structure and the actual cost/burden of USO are directly related to regulation and 
the funding mechanism in place. Similar points are raised in Jaag and Trinkner 
(2011) and Borsenberger et al. (2010). Hence, the cost of universal service provi-
sion under competition differs from the monopoly case and competitive interac-
tion must be taken into account: A strong USO invites competition by limiting the 
USP‟s means to position itself in the market and by offering cream-skimming 
opportunities to competing operators. 
We extend these analyses by explicitly discussing the interaction of the 
regulatory environment, the operating firms‟ strategies and the cost of universal 
service provision.
5
We hence not only take into account competitive interaction in 
the market, but also competition for the market. Our paper is therefore related to 
the game-theoretic literature on market entry deterrence pioneered by Spence 
(1977) and Dixit (1980). They show that incumbents can credibly commit to ag-
gressive behavior to deter potential competitors from entering by building extra 
capacity to lower average cost. In the case that the cost of capacity is sunk, the 
threat to lower prices if entry occurs is credible. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) argue that the less the incumbent's cost de-
pends on output, the greater is its ability to deter entry. Therefore, potential entry 
may bias its choice of technology towards capacity-intensive production modes. 
In addition, it may opt for long-term labor contracts that specify rigid wages with 
a minimum of temporary layoffs and variability of hours. Consequently, the in-
                                                
5
Recent attempts to actually calculate the cost of universal service provision fall short of these 
insights by not considering the interaction between various USO dimensions and by not defining 
the regulatory alternative; see Boldron et al. (2006), Bradley et al. (2008), and Copenhagen Eco-
nomics (2008). Jaag et al. (2009) account for interactions between USO dimensions by advocating 
a „global approach‟. However, they do not define the regulatory alternative, either. 
3
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cumbent is less able to adapt to successful entry. This argument implies that an 
incumbent‟s successful business strategy depends on the characteristic of the 
markets in which it is operating: 
If successful entry is likely in a market segment, it is important to have a 
flexible cost structure in order to be able to cope with competition. 
If a market is likely to be served by only one firm in equilibrium, it is 
sensible to have a more rigid cost structure and to sink costs in order to 
deter entry by credibly committing to act aggressively. 
Gilbert and Vives (1986) extend the Spence-Dixit models to consider multiple 
incumbents; Rasmussen (1988) augments them by allowing the incumbent to 
“buy out” the entrant. He shows that the Spence-Dixit result is only valid if the 
incumbent can commit not to acquire the entrant. This literature shows that the 
most important ingredient to entry deterrence is a credible threat to behave ag-
gressively. Such a threat typically involves an investment, e.g. in capacity, which 
is inefficient and costly to the incumbent firm. 
In the context of the model we discuss below, successful entry deterrence 
implies for an operator to credibly commit to operate in certain market segments 
or regions. While a universal service obligation usually also causes additional 
cost, it may be a comparably cost-effective tool to commit.
6
In such a situation, 
the net cost of the USO to the universal service provider may be negative even 
though it entails inefficient operation. 
2 The Model 
Our model serves to discuss the strategic effects of a universal service obligation 
in liberalized markets. For simplicity, we assume here that the USO simply con-
sists of a coverage constraint which obliges the USP to offer services in all re-
gions of a country. 
2.1 Markets and Entry Decisions 
As in Valletti et al (2002), there are two firms, an incumbent I and an entrant E. 
Each firm offers one type of product or service which are imperfect substitutes. 
They operate in a continuum [0,1] of independent markets.
7
Each market is of 
                                                
6
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) argue that also the installed user base of a network good can serve a 
preemptive function which is similar to that of an investment in capacity. 
7
In real markets, there may be economies of scope between different regions (see e.g. Panzar, 
2008, for the postal sector). However, they affect only the size of profits (through reduced incre-
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equal size, but markets are ordered by fixed costs. If a firm decides to enter a 
market at location x, it incurs fixed costs c(x) where c(0)=0 and c’(x)>0. Each 
firm starts entering markets from the least expensive location and leaves no gaps 
between served locations.  
We denote by r(x) the incremental surplus for a firm obtained at location x
which we assume to be positive at all locations.
8
It is higher if only one firm oper-
ates in a market than in a situation with two operators. Gross profit is (x)= r(x)-
c(x)dx over the markets which are served. For simplicity, we assume symmetry 
between both firms in terms of cost and revenues in each market x. Further, we 
assume that demand and cost characteristics are such that all markets belong to 
one of the three following regions: 
In region D, competition results in positive profit for both operators.  
In low-cost region L, a firm‟s profit is positive only if it is operating as a 
monopoly. 
In high-cost region H, not even a monopolist is able to cover its fixed 
costs because these are too high. 
Note that whether or not duopoly profits for one or both operators are negative is 
hence given by the definition of the regions. 
In the following discussion, we neglect profits in region D and consider 
only regions L and H.
9 A firm‟s profit in region i is i,M if the region is served by 
only one firm and i,D if it is served by both firms. Fixed costs in region i are de-
noted by ci. For simplicity, we assume that payoffs in each of the regions are 
symmetric between firms.
10
The above definitions imply that L,D<0< L,M and 
H,D< H,M<0. 
The market structure which we simply assume here results from competi-
tion as modeled by Valletti et al. (2002) and Jaag and Trinkner (2011). In contrast 
to their analysis, however, we do not assume that the incumbent is always the 
bigger firm operating in the monopoly region L. It is the strategic interaction be-
                                                                                                                                    
mental costs of entering additional markets), but not the profits‟ signs. Also, the ordering of profits 
in different regions will not be affected. Therefore, the model assumption that there are no econo-
mies of scope does not result in a loss of generality of our results. The only exemption is the equi-
librium in mixed strategies discussed in Footnote 19 where the probability of serving a region 
depends on relative profit levels. 
8
The surplus is defined as the difference between revenues and variable costs. 
9 This is not critical for the analysis as profits in region D are irrelevant for the operators‟ strategic 
decisions if the compensation for an unfair burden is exogenous, which is the case in our setting. 
Jaag and Trinkner (2011) relax this assumption. 
10
In reality, they may differ for the two firms due to sequential decisions or due to strategic links 
between markets induced e.g. by a price uniformity constraint as part of the USO. However, this 
simplifying assumption does not alter payoff-structures decisively. 
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tween the two firms that determines which operator finally is the bigger one, such 
that firm size is endogenous in our setting. 
We analyze the equilibria of the market entry game in various regulatory 
regimes and assuming the assignment of the USO to one of the two operators as 
given. Note that we do not explicitly model the effect of USO payments on the 
equilibrium outcomes of our model. In case the USP is compensated by public 
funds, this is straightforward, as there is no interaction with the operators‟ market 
strategies. However, a USO fund and operators‟ contributions to it may signifi-
cantly alter the equilibrium outcomes. It would go beyond the scope of this paper 
to discuss these effects in detail. We refer to Jaag and Trinkner (2011) and Jaag 
(2010) who discuss the interaction of USO costing and financing and the effect of 
the financing on the resulting financial burden, respectively. 
2.2 Sequential Entry 
In this section we treat the incumbent and the entrant asymmetrically, assuming 
that the incumbent decides first about its market coverage. The relevant question 
is whether firms choose to be present in region L where profits result only if there 
are no other firms in the markets. The most generic situation is competition with 
both the incumbent and the entrant being free to choose either to operate in that 
market or not, i.e. there is neither a reserved area nor universal service obligation. 
Figure 1 shows the decision tree in this setting. The incumbent I decides first. Its 
possible actions are staying in the market (s) and abandon it (a). The entrant E
decides second; its feasible actions are entering the market (e) or not (n). Hence, 
in this general setting, the incumbent‟s strategy set is SI ={{s},{a}}, while the en-
trant‟s strategy set is SE={{e,e},{e,n},{n,e},{n,n}}. The payoffs following the ter-
minal nodes depend on the nature of the fixed costs and the regulatory scenario. 
They are reported in the four rows in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. 
The payoffs account for the assumption that the Incumbent used to be the USP in 
the past. 
Figure 1: Sequential entry in region L (payoffs are given in Table 1, Table 2 and 
Table 3). 
I 
E 
a 
s 
n 
n 
e 
E 
e 
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There are four different potential outcomes/equilibria in pure strategies of 
this entry game. The resulting profits are given in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 in 
the column “Competition / no USO” as a benchmark for the comparison with sce-
narios including USO. The subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies 
for each regulatory scenario is highlighted by a bold typeface. 
As another reference, we also show the outcomes in a situation with a le-
gal monopoly in which only the incumbent is allowed to operate in the market. In 
the following, we discuss two different cases resulting from different assumptions 
on the nature of the fixed costs: In Section 2.2.1 we assume fixed costs to be pre-
determined in the sense that investments from the past are irreversible and cause 
depreciation costs irrespective of whether they are still needed in the firm‟s opera-
tions.
11
In Section 2.2.2 we assume that the spending of all fixed cost is deter-
mined continuously.
12
2.2.1 Predetermined Fixed Costs 
The payoffs for scenarios in which fixed costs are entirely predetermined are giv-
en in Table 1 and in Table 2.
 13
Each of the four rows shows the payoff following 
a terminal node in Figure 1. The columns represent regulatory scenarios. The se-
quence of entry is of great importance in all regulatory scenarios. Recall that we 
assume that the incumbent has offered universal services traditionally and before 
the USO is newly assigned to one of the operators. Then, the incumbent opera-
tor‟s cost would not be reduced by abandoning region L in case the USO is re-
moved. Hence, staying is a dominant strategy, because this will result in positive 
revenues and hence a profit that is greater than without any revenues. The incum-
bent will even stay in region H because all fixed costs are predetermined and pro-
ducer‟s surplus is positive in all locations. 
                                                
11
Examples for predetermined fixed costs are investments in telecommunications or railway infra-
structures. 
12
These are two extreme cases which delimit the range of possible situations. 
13
The following example illustrates how Figure 1 can be read in conjunction with Table 1: In the 
regulatory scenario with a legal monopoly and no USO, the payoffs resulting from ({a},{n,n}) are 
(-cL-cH,0). 
7
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Legal monopoly 
no USO I is USP 
({s},{e,e}) 
({s},{e,n}) 
n/a n/a 
({s},{n,e}) 
({s},{n,n}) 
( L,M+ H,M,0) ( L,M+ H,M,0) 
({a},{e,e}) 
({a},{n,e}) 
n/a n/a 
({a},{e,n}) 
({a},{n,n}) 
(-cL-cH,0) n/a 
Table 1: Payoffs in regions L and H with sequential entry and predetermined 
fixed costs in the monopoly case.
14
 
Competition 
no USO I is USP E is USP 
({s},{e,e}) 
({s},{e,n}) 
( L,D+ H,M, L,D) ( L,D+ H,M, L,D) ( L,D+ H,D, L,D+ H,D) 
({s},{n,e}) 
({s},{n,n}) 
( L,M+ H,M,0) ( L,M+ H,M,0) n/a 
({a},{e,e}) 
({a},{n,e}) 
(-cL-cH, L,M) n/a (-cL-cH, L,M+ H,M) 
({a},{e,n}) 
({a},{n,n}) 
(-cL-cH,0) n/a n/a 
Table 2: Payoffs in regions L and H with sequential entry and predetermined 
fixed costs in the competition case. 
The equilibrium in the scenario in which the incumbent is obliged to con-
tinue providing universal services (scenario “Competition – I is USP”) is the same 
as in the scenario “Competition – no USO”: The incumbent serves all regions and 
the entrant will neither serve region L nor region H. The profitability cost ap-
proach calls for a comparison of the USP‟s profit level with and without USO. 
The resulting net cost of the USO depends on whether there is a USO in the regu-
latory alternative. Hence, it is not sufficiently defined without knowing the coun-
terfactual regulatory scenario: 
Compared to a situation without any USO, the scenario “Competition / I
is USP” results in zero net cost (compare the equilibrium payoffs in Ta-
ble 1 “Competition no USO” and “Competition / I is USP”) because 
there are no incentives for the traditional USP to change the scope of its 
                                                 
14
 The entry n/a means that such an outcome is not feasible due to the definition of the regulatory 
scenario: With a legal monopoly, E‟s market entry is not possible. In case there is a USO, the USP 
is obliged to operate in all markets. 
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operations without USO.
15
There may be a burden resulting from ineffi-
cient operations. However, it does not result from the current USO but 
from the USO in the past.
16
Compared to a situation in which the entrant is the USP, the net cost is    
– L,M– H,M+ L,D+ H,D, which is negative: If the entrant was the USP, in-
stead of monopoly profits the incumbent would just make duopoly prof-
its all regions. 
If the entrant is the designated USP, the net cost of the USO is – L,D– H,D>0. 
Hence, (hypothetically) tendering the USO would result in the entrant requiring 
L,D+ H,D as a compensation if it wins the USO contract. Compared to being the 
USP himself, the incumbent would be worse off in this situation because of com-
petition in region L. Hence, it would be willing to pay L,M+ H,M– L,D– H,D in or-
der to avoid that outcome. As a result, USO tendering would end up in the incum-
bent being the USP with low or even negative compensation because there would 
be no positive net cost and therefore no unfair burden. 
The current legislation in the Swiss telecommunications market can be 
understood in light of the above considerations. Resulting from a public call for 
tenders for the award of a universal service license, the Federal Communications 
Commission has designated Swisscom (the incumbent operator) as the USP from 
2008 onwards. For ten years, Swisscom will be obliged to provide universal ser-
vices in the telecommunications sector to all sections of the population and in all 
regions of the country. The new license obliges Swisscom to provide a broadband 
internet connection in addition to analogue and digital telephone connections. All 
services are subject to a price cap and a specific level of quality. In particular, the 
universal service in Switzerland will incorporate a broadband internet connection 
for all households. This is worldwide unique.  
Swisscom had almost full coverage for broadband connections before the 
USO tender. As most of the investment cost is predetermined once broadband 
connections have been set up, the net cost of universal service provision for the 
incumbent is very low. Consequently, Swisscom has refrained from applying for 
financial compensation for the first five years of the licence. 
                                                
15
While the net cost of the USO is zero, there is clearly a profitability cost of opening the market: 
Not in regions L and H where the competitive equilibrium remains unchanged, but in region D
where market entry degrades the incumbent‟s profits. 
16
This result is similar to a finding in Jaag et al. (2010) who argue that there are strong path-
dependencies in the development of markets. Therefore, legacy costs and benefits need to be taken 
into account in determining the net cost of the USO. 
9
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2.2.2 Non-predetermined Fixed Costs 
If costs are not predetermined (i.e. reversible), the situation is slightly different 
from the situation with predetermined costs. Given the sequence in Figure 1, it is 
clear from Table 3 that in competition without USO, outcome ({s},{n,e}) is again 
the only subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies. Hence, the incum-
bent is a monopolist in region L even if there is no legal monopoly. However, it 
will not serve region H in this case. 
The introduction of a universal service obligation again requires the uni-
versal service provider (USP) to be present in all regions. Assume first that the 
incumbent is assigned to be the USP. Then, the USP‟s payoff is reduced, but the 
competitive equilibrium allocation is not altered (see Table 3). 
If the entrant is the USP by designation, however, the equilibrium is now 
({a},{e,e}). This results from the entrant being able to credibly affirm that it will 
operate in all markets. Because the incumbent expects a loss in region L in this 
situation, it will not operate there. Hence, in the case that the entrant is the USP, 
the net cost of the USO is unambiguously equal to – L,M– H,M. 
Legal monopoly Competition 
no USO I is USP no USO I is USP E is USP 
({s},{e,e}) 
({s},{e,n}) 
n/a n/a ( L,D, L,D) ( L,D+ H,M, L,D) ( L,D, L,D+ H,M) 
({s},{n,e}) 
({s},{n,n}) 
( L,M,0) ( L,M+ H,M,0) ( L,M,0) ( L,M+ H,M,0) n/a 
({a},{e,e}) 
({a},{n,e}) 
n/a n/a (0, L,M) n/a (0, L,M+ H,M) 
({a},{e,n}) 
({a},{n,n}) 
(0,0) n/a (0,0) n/a n/a 
Table 3: Payoffs in regions L and H with sequential entry without predetermined 
fixed costs. 
If the incumbent is the USP, there are two different possible alternative 
scenarios on which the correct compensation depends: 
If the alternative to the incumbent‟s universal service provision is no 
universal service obligation at all, the net cost of the USO amounts to     
– H,M which is the incremental loss due to operating in the unattractive 
region H. This is the same net cost as in the case of a legal monopoly. 
If the alternative is the entrant being the USP, the net cost of the USO 
amounts to – L,M– H,M. 
10
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Hence, depending on the regulatory alternative, both the incumbent and the en-
trant may be willing to pay for receiving the USO license as this prevents the oth-
er firm‟s operation in region L. This is true iff L,M+ H,M>0. If this condition does 
not hold, neither operator has a strategic interest to be designated as USP because 
the profit of being the sole operator in region L is less attractive than the loss from 
operating in region H. 
An example for the case of reversible USO fixed costs with sequential 
entry is the operation of post offices in rural areas. These cause recurrent costs. 
Closing or replacing them by agencies which are run by third parties would ena-
ble incumbent postal operators to considerably reduce costs.
17
The introduction or 
perpetuation of a universal service obligation, e.g. by an area coverage constraint 
for some services introduces/prolongs inefficient operations and therefore poten-
tially causes net costs to the universal service provider. However, a firm may be 
willing to refrain from being compensated because the USO provides it with 
commitment power in competition. This is similar to sunk costs and the first-
mover-advantage (as discussed in Section 2.2.1) serving the same purpose for an 
incumbent operator. The next section discusses the implications of simultaneous 
entry decisions where neither firm is a first mover. 
2.3 Simultaneous Entry 
Even though there usually is an incumbent operator facing one or multiple en-
trants, in some situations it is more appropriate to model strategic interaction as a 
non-sequential instead of a sequential game. This is the case if strategic moves are 
not observable, if moves can be revised without much cost or if new products or 
services are offered in the market, which are unrelated to other existing offers. In 
the following, we assume simultaneous entry and no predetermined fixed costs. 
In the symmetric case, the entrant‟s strategy set is reduced to SE={{e},{n}}
and therefore equivalent to the incumbent‟s as it can no longer condition its action 
on the incumbent‟s behavior (see Figure 2).18
                                                
17
See Buser, Jaag, and Trinkner (2008) and Jaag, Koller, and Trinkner (2008) for a recent discus-
sion of the cost of postal outlet networks. 
18
This is the classic „chicken game‟, see e.g. Osborne und Rubinstein (1994). 
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Figure 2: Simultaneous entry in region L (payoffs are reported in Table 4). 
The payoff-structure with symmetric entry is the same as with sequential 
entry and no sunk costs. However, in the competitive case with no USO, there are 
now two Nash-equilibria in pure strategies.
19
Whoever ends up serving region L is 
better off than the other firm. The payoffs are given in Table 4. 
The incumbent can no longer count on a first-mover advantage. Rather, it 
is typically the entrant who is smaller and more innovative who may be able to 
lock the market in its favor. Facing this situation, each operator has an incentive 
to move first in order to change the rules and end up in the situation described in 
Section 2.2.2 above. 
Legal monopoly Competition 
no USO I is USP no USO I is USP E is USP 
({s},{e}) n/a n/a ( L,D, L,D) ( L,D+ H,M, L,D) ( L,D, L,D+ H,M) 
({s},{n}) ( L,M,0) ( L,M+ H,M,0) ( L,M,0) ( L,M+ H,M,0) n/a 
({a},{e}) n/a n/a (0, L,M) n/a (0, L,M+ H,M) 
({a},{n}) (0,0) n/a (0,0) n/a n/a 
Table 4: Payoffs in regions L and H with simultaneous entry. 
A typical example for such a situation is entry into the market for physical 
mail delivery. Usually, more than half of the total delivery costs are fixed (i.e. 
independent of volume).
20
They result from the postman following a fixed tour 
and accrue anew with every delivery tour. As the delivery network is built every 
day from scratch, no operator is able to commit to being in the market (which 
would be important to prevent the other player from entering). The introduction of 
                                                
19 Both operators‟ duopoly profit is negative, while monopoly profit in the low cost region is posi-
tive. There is a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies in which both operators are active in the 
high-cost region with a probability of – L,M/( L,D– L,M). Actual outcomes are still represented by 
the four rows in Table 4. However, with mixed strategies, ({s},{e}) and ({a},{n}) are possible equi-
librium outcomes, too. 
20
See e.g. Jaag (2007). 
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a USO solves this commitment problem. Despite causing inefficient operations by 
forcing the USP to serve region H, being the USP may be attractive.
21
Compared to the outcome in which the other firm is the USP, each opera-
tor gains L,M+ H,M. In a tender, monopoly rents from operation in region L can 
be skimmed. However, from a policy perspective, the downside of introducing a 
USO is again the hindrance of competition in this region. This may explain, e.g. 
in the railway sector, the allocation of USO jointly with the right to operate cer-
tain lines exclusively (“franchise bidding”).22
Compared to the outcome without a USO, the gain of being the USP de-
pends on the relative efficiency of the operators: If the designated USP is less 
efficient than its competitor, without USO the competitor would be active in re-
gion L. In this case, the net cost of the USO is equal to – L,M– H,M. Hence, if the 
loss in region H is smaller than the profit in region L ( L,M+ H,M>0), the designat-
ed USP will profit from this designation because it is able to preempt region L. 
However, if the designated USP is more efficient than its competitor, even in the 
absence of a USO, it would operate in region L. In that case, the USO has no 
commitment value and the net cost is equal to – H,M. If both operators are equally 
efficient, the mixed strategy equilibrium can be considered to be the relevant 
counterfactual scenario without USO. Expected profits of both operators are then 
–( L,M)
2
/( L,D– L,M) and the net cost of the USO is –( L,M)
2
/( L,D– L,M)– L,M– H,M. 
In the postal sector, compensation for the provision of universal services 
has been paid to various national postal operators.
23
In Austria and Denmark these 
payments no longer exist
24
while in France
25
, Italy
26
and Belgium
27
such compen-
sation still exists. Only at the beginning of 2011 these markets have become fully 
liberalized. In none of the fully liberalized countries, the USP claims compensa-
                                                
21
Postal markets are usually considered to be contestable because there are no sunk costs, see e.g. 
Panzar (2002). With a USO, this result is questioned because the USP is not able to exit the mar-
ket and, therefore, a potential entrant‟s threat to compete may not be credible. 
22
See e.g. Harstad and Crew (1999). 
23
ITA Consulting and WIK Consulting (2009). 
24
In Austria the compensation paid to Austrian Post ended in 2001 (see Austrian Post, Geschäfts-
bericht 2001, p.45); in Denmark in 2004 (see Post Danmark, Annual report 2003, p. 15). 
25
In France the government contribution was EUR 242m in 2007 (ARCEP, 2008, Statistical Ob-
servatory on Postal Activities in France – 2007, p. 36). However, this public subsidy is not com-
pensation of net cost of the USO, which is solely financed by the monopoly on letter weighing less 
than 50 grams (until the end of 2010). It compensates the public mission to deliver newspapers 
throughout the whole country. 
26
Poste Italiane receives a state compensation for losses in universal services and publications 
delivery. In 2008 it amounted to EUR 706m. The Commission has decided to consider the aid 
compatible with the EC Treaty. However, “[t]he Commission regrets that Italy put the aid in ques-
tion into effect, in breach of article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.” (European Commission, 2008, State 
aid n. NN 24/08, p. 19). 
27
See De Post–La Poste, Annual Financial Report 2007, p. 78-79; 
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tion. In Germany, the postal law foresees an auction to designate the most effi-
cient operator in case universal services are not provided by the market. The me-
chanism is in place since 2008, when the German postal market was completely 
opened to competition. So far, the historic incumbent operator Deutsche Post did 
not change its services in a way that would have resulted in a public need and 
hence an auction. Hence, Deutsche Post provides universal services without being 
mandated explicitly and without compensation.
28
Coming back to the Swiss telecommunications example, Swisscom is not 
obliged to provide services to customers if another telecommunications services 
operator offers broadband services to them which are comparable in terms of the 
speeds and prices specified in the obligations of the universal service license. 
What looks like an alleviation of the USO may actually result in a higher burden 
on Swisscom because the USO in this case does not serve as a commitment tool 
to protect against competition in semi-rural regions. 
Hence, in order to prevent the entry-deterring impact of a USO, it may be 
optimal to confine it to services which would not be offered otherwise, as in the 
Swiss telecommunications case. 
3 Summary and Conclusion 
There is a broad literature on strategic entry deterrence, e.g. by according tech-
nology and capacity choice. The contribution of this paper is to describe an alter-
native commitment device and its value in a simplified model framework. The 
paper argues that universal service obligations may prevent entry in certain re-
gions or market segments by facilitating commitment. A USO allows a firm to 
have a flexible cost-structure and to fend off competition at the same time. Hence, 
policy makers face a counter-intuitive challenge when designing universal service 
obligations: The stricter it is regulated, the more detrimental it may be to competi-
tion and therefore the smaller is its burden on the USP. 
In the Swiss telecommunications market, the USP is not obliged to pro-
vide services to customers if another telecommunications services operator offers 
these comparable in terms of quality and prices specified in the universal service 
license. Such a regulation prevents the entry-deterring impact of a USO because it 
destroys its functioning as a commitment tool. It may therefore be optimal also in 
other sectors to confine the USO to services which would not be provided other-
wise instead of requiring universal services even if some of them are voluntarily 
offered by competitors. 
Our argument also has implications for the costing of the USO and the 
calculation of the burden it causes. It is important to be aware of the regulatory 
                                                
28
Zauner et al. (2008) and Jaag and Trinkner (2009). 
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alternative because this very much determines the burden of the USP. Further 
research on this topic may include a more realistic consideration of various di-
mensions of the USO, the consideration of economies of scope between various 
regions and the effect of various USO payments to compensate for an unfair bur-
den. 
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